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 This study investigates the effect of communication channel (e.g., face-to-face, 
written) and management information (i.e., background information on the reliability of 
client personnel) on auditors’ judgments of evidence persuasiveness in a management 
inquiry setting. Management information directs auditors to focus on the source of the 
evidence, creating a goal of assessing management during evidence collection. Auditors 
are distracted away from the evidence when the communication channel presents 
management characteristic cues (i.e., face-to-face), unrelated to the message and related 
to their new unconscious goal of assessing management. By comparison, when evidence 
is communicated by a channel that does not provide additional management characteristic 
cues (i.e. written), auditors are better able to evaluate the evidence without distraction. I 
predict an interaction effect, where communication channel effects auditor judgments 
when management information is provided, but not otherwise.  
I design a 2x2 between-participants experiment to test my theory and present 
results of an experiment with 122 practicing senior auditors. Auditor participants receive 
an explanation from a client’s assistant controller to explain an unexpected fluctuation in 
a financial ratio. I manipulate the means by which the assistant controller communicates 
with the auditor (communication channel) and the presence of background information 
about the assistant controller (management information). Results of my experiment 
indicate an interaction effect of the communication channel and management 
information. When management information is provided, auditors assess the evidence as 
more persuasive when communication is face-to-face versus text. Auditors not receiving 
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management information do not assess the evidence any differently, irrespective of 
communication channel. I also find evidence that auditors assess management differently 
when management information is provided. The results suggest that auditors are focused 
more on evaluating management when communicating through face-to-face versus 
written channels. Further, these assessments of management are consistent with the 
pattern of persuasiveness, indicating that they use this information more in their 
judgments when communicating face-to-face versus text and only when management 
information is provided. The results of this research suggest auditors may be assessing 
evidence as more persuasive than merited when management information is present and 
auditors are communicating with management face-to-face. Auditors as well as regulators 
should be aware of this effect so that adjustments can be made. Future researchers should 












This study reports the results of an experiment designed to investigate the effect 
of communication channel and management information (i.e., background information on 
the reliability of client personnel) on auditors’ evaluation of evidence during management 
inquiry. Auditors collect evidence by communicating directly with client management 
throughout the audit to clear up uncertainty and ambiguity (PCAOB 2010b). Although 
auditor-management interactions occur routinely, the nature of such interactions can vary 
widely based on the setting. For example, in some situations auditors communicate with 
management through written means (via email) and in others, the communication occurs 
face-to-face. The nature of communication, or the channel chosen, is often a matter of 
convenience. Yet, recent evidence suggests that certain situations cause auditors to prefer 
one communication channel as opposed to others (Bennett & Hatfield 2012). Importantly, 
social psychology research suggests that communication channel affects individuals’ 
processing of information in social interactions. As such, when collecting evidence 
through management inquiry, auditors’ processing of evidence may differ depending on 
the communication channel. 
Features of the audit environment potentially affect how communication channel 
impacts information processing. Professional guidance requires auditors to evaluate client 
personnel as a source of evidence (PCAOB 2010a). Further, auditors are expected to 
maintain an attitude of professional skepticism, particularly when evaluating the 
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reliability of the source of evidence (i.e., management information) 1 (Messier, Glover, & 
Prawitt 2006, p. 97).  Indeed some firms are beginning to introduce formalized procedures 
for evaluating management’s competence (i.e., education and experience). Although the 
content of this information arguably influences auditors, social psychology research 
indicates that providing management information, regardless of its content, can change 
the way that auditors process information (Higgins & Bargh 1987). Such information can 
lead auditors to focus more on the source of the evidence rather than its diagnosticity. As 
elaborated subsequently, this focus on management information likely interacts with the 
communication channel in determining auditors’ judgments. The interaction leads to 
larger differences in persuasiveness judgments between channels of communication when 
management information is provided to auditors as opposed to when the information is 
not provided. 
Dual process theories in social psychology shed light on the expected interaction 
and identify two routes individuals can take when making judgments, central and 
peripheral2 (Chaiken 1980; Petty & Cacioppo 1986). Although both routes influence the 
resulting judgment, many factors affect the likelihood that an individual takes the central 
or the peripheral route. In general, higher motivation and ability to process information 
leads to central route processing (Petty & Cacioppo 1986). Motivation to process 
information stems from the consequences of an individual’s judgment, such as 
accountability. The ability to process the information relates to environmental/task 
                                                 
1 In a management inquiry setting, the source of the evidence is management personnel. The information 
provided pertains to the reliability of that source, independent of any management information acquired 
during the inquiry. 
2 These two routes have many variations on the terms used to articulate the two routes. Their meanings are 
similar across the literature (e.g. system 1, system 2; deliberative, intuitive; systematic, heuristic; central, 
peripheral). I focus on central and peripheral model in the current paper due to its direct application to 
persuasive communications.  
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specific factors such as time pressure and experience (Bonner 1999). Communication 
channel affects an individual’s ability to process information using the central route based 
on the inclusion of additional cues, which crowd out the content of the message (Booth‐
Butterfield & Gutowski 1993). This crowding out increases the likelihood an individual 
will process the message peripherally. Peripheral route processing can lead to a multitude 
of short cuts in processing, one of which is heuristics. 
Heuristics can be triggered due to the nature of the task or environment, or they 
can be activated as a result of prior recent experience (Kahneman & Frederick 2002).  
Management information focuses auditors’ attention on management personnel, 
increasing their attention to assessing management’s characteristics (Clark, Wegener, 
Sawicki, Petty, & Briñol 2013; Wilson & Sherrell 1993). In the presence of this 
information, individuals focus their attention on the personal attributes of the source 
(Higgins & Bargh 1987; Mae, Carlston, & Skowronski 1999), with a goal of forming an 
impression of the person (Higgins, Rholes, & Jones 1977). When auditors evaluate the 
source of evidence, they are more likely to use the characteristics of management as a 
heuristic as opposed to the message in making their judgment (eg. Higgins & Brendl 
1995).  
When management information is provided, a heuristic of the source is triggered. 
Auditors using face-to-face communication will base their assessments of evidence on 
management as evaluated during the message delivery because of the salient management 
characteristic cues. This allows auditors to easily evaluate evidence using their 
assessments of management as a heuristic of the persuasiveness of evidence (Booth‐
Butterfield & Gutowski 1993). On the other hand, because a written channel does not 
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present salient management characteristics, the evidence can be evaluated on the merits 
of the message (Petty & Wegener 1998b). This focus on assessing management drives 
auditors’ judgments of evidence persuasiveness to differ between face-to-face and written 
communication. Their judgments of evidence persuasiveness will differ consistently with 
their assessments of management. If management information is not provided, heuristics 
of the person are not triggered and, thus, no difference between face-to-face and written 
communication is expected.   
 I design a 2x2 between-participants experiment that manipulates communication 
channel (video/written) and the presence of management information (information 
provided/information not provided). I use 122 practicing senior auditors as participants. 
They perform an analytical procedures task as part of an audit engagement, similar to 
Anderson et al. (1994). Communication channel is manipulated through a difference in 
the method of delivery, holding the content of the explanation constant. The presence of 
management information is manipulated consistent with prior studies and is independent 
of any management information received from the communication channel 
(Bhattacharjee, Moreno, & Riley 2012; Hirst 1994). To measure auditors’ judgments of 
the persuasiveness of evidence, I use their assessed likelihood of material misstatement 
before and after receiving an explanation from the client. Those who decrease their 
assessed likelihood of material misstatement more after the explanation are deemed to 
find the evidence more persuasive.   
 An experiment is ideal for investigating this issue because the constructs of 
interest in the present study are difficult to control in practice. For example, management 
information is always present in an audit environment as auditors typically know about 
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the person they are communicating with ahead of time. Additionally, various channels of 
communication are used throughout the audit, making it difficult to investigate the impact 
of a specific channel on audit conclusions. An experiment allows me to carefully 
manipulate these variables, while controlling for other factors to ensure the effects found 
are based on the variables of interest. It allows me to pinpoint an aspect of the audit 
environment, management information, which interacts with the communication channel. 
 I find results consistent with my theoretical prediction. When management 
information is provided, the persuasiveness of evidence is affected by communication 
channel. Specifically, evidence is deemed more persuasive when communicated using 
visual and audio cues. This difference does not arise when management information is 
not provided. In addition, in the presence of management information, auditors evaluate 
management more favorably when communication occurs face-to-face. This pattern is 
consistent with a stronger effect of management characteristics on auditors’ assessments 
of evidence persuasiveness when communicating face-to-face and when management 
information is provided to the participants.  
 Because management inquiry happens routinely during an audit in formal and 
informal ways, its impact on the quality of evidence collected and the resulting audit 
opinion cannot be overstated. Judgments made in the evaluation of evidence collected 
during management inquiry determine the nature and extent of additional testing, 
impacting the quality and quantity of audit evidence. An audit opinion is supported by the 
evidence collected throughout field work, whereby higher quality evidence leads to a 
higher quality audit. The importance of audit evidence is confirmed by the focus that the 
PCAOB places on documentation in their inspections. A large number of the deficiencies 
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identified during their inspection process focuses on sufficient appropriate evidence and 
its documentation (Church & Shefchik 2012; Hermanson, Houston, & Rice 2007). 
Understanding the impact of communicating with the client through written versus face-
to-face channels on judgments of evidence persuasiveness can inform practitioners, 
researchers, and regulators.  
This study has strong practical implications. Public accounting firms should be 
aware of the influence of communication channel and management information on 
auditors’ judgments. These differences in judgments may partially explain observations 
by regulators of auditors’ lack of documentation or professional skepticism in practice. In 
current practice, auditors are more likely to have management information, indicating 
that auditors may perceive evidence as more persuasive based only on the communication 
channel. When communicating face-to-face, auditors may fail to sufficiently follow up 
with client personnel to collect additional evidence. Failure to follow up can lead to 
inadequate documentation due to a lack of sufficient evidence and the appearance of an 
absence of professional skepticism. Further, academics should be interested in these 
results due to the impact on research design. Due to the interactive effect of 
communication with management information, investigating auditor judgments in a 
written only environment, without interaction with the client, may lead to incomplete 
conclusions.  
 The balance of this paper is organized as follows. First, I provide background on 
relevant research and provide theory to set forth hypotheses. Second, I describe the 
experimental design. I then provide a summary of the experimental results and analyses. 




 BACKGROUND AND RELATED LITERATURE 
 
 
   
 In this chapter I provide background into the setting for the current study. First, I 
provide context into what management inquiry is and why I believe it to be an important 
evidence collection mechanism to examine. Next, I discuss management inquiry studies 
which explore the impact of management information on auditor judgments. In addition, I 
discuss how communication channels may impact auditor judgments based on prior 
studies both within and outside of accounting. Lastly, I describe dual process theories and 
their relationship to management inquiry and the current study. Throughout this section, I 
provide insight into how this study can contribute to the current audit literature.   
2.1 Management Inquiry 
 Auditors collect evidence in a variety of ways. They may collect evidence through 
inspection, observation, confirmation, recalculation, reperformance, analytical 
procedures, and inquiry (PCAOB 2010b). Management inquiry is a unique form of 
evidence collection in that it is used along with other methods. Indeed, whenever an 
auditor receives inconsistent or ambiguous evidence, their first course of action is to 
inquire of management. Though evidence received through management inquiry cannot 
stand on its own, the persuasiveness of the evidence determines the extent of additional 
testing the auditor will perform. The nature and extent of further testing, which 
constitutes the evidence behind the audit opinion, depends on auditors interpreting 
evidence appropriately, particularly that collected through management inquiry. 
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Consequently, management inquiry has a pervasive effect on audit conclusions and 
overall audit quality. 
 With the pervasive impact management inquiry has on audit quality, research in 
this area is lacking. Of the few studies that have researched this setting, most are limited 
in the constructs they investigate. Studies investigating management inquiry are typically 
depicted with a written response from management (e.g., Anderson & Koonce 1995), 
even though management inquiry can occur through various channels. Further, although 
these studies provide insight into the impact of the content of management information 
on auditor judgments, there remains two gaps in the literature. First, the majority of these 
studies were completed prior to recent significant changes in the audit regulatory 
environment (i.e., the institution and increased power of the PCAOB), which has changed 
the way that auditors approach evidence evaluation. Second, because they primarily 
investigate a written management inquiry setting, they cannot generalize to all channels 
of communication. 
 Although the earlier studies find auditors are influenced by the content of 
management information, research suggests that recent regulatory changes have altered 
the way auditors approach evidence. Auditors assess audit evidence differently due the 
higher level of scrutiny from the PCAOB, applying more of a presumptive doubt 
perspective (Quadackers, Groot, & Wright 2014). This perspective leads auditors to be 
more skeptical of unsupported evidence, such as evidence from management inquiry. 
These studies also fail to recognize how channels of communication may interact with 
the presence of management information. Social psychology literature suggests that 
management information can prompt different processing depending on the channel of 
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communication. Based on this social psychology research I expect that management 
inquiry evidence, and specifically information on the reliability of management (i.e., 
management information), would influence auditor judgements depending on whether 
management information is provided and the channel of communication used.  
2.2 Management Information  
Audit standards require auditors to consider the reliability of the source of 
evidence they collect (PCAOB 2010a). Management inquiry is no exception. In fact 
formal documentation of the reliability of client personnel (i.e., management information) 
occurs in practice. Reliability is comprised of assessments of an individual’s level of 
objectivity or competence. An individual high in objectivity and competence would be 
considered a highly reliable source. While an individual low in objectivity and low in 
competence would be considered a source low in reliability. Management is assumed to 
be low in objectivity as they are providing evidence in support of their own work during 
management inquiry. Therefore, when evaluating the reliability of management, the 
information auditors should be most concerned about relates to the competence of 
management. I term this information on the competence of management, including 
background on their training and experience, management information.   
Regulators who require auditors to consider management information presume 
that the content of such information is influencing auditors’ judgements. However, 
research on the impact of the content of management information on auditor judgments is 
mixed. Early research suggests that information about the source of evidence only 
matters when the source is high in objectivity. Bamber (1983) finds the competence of 
the source impacts audit managers’ judgments of evidence persuasiveness when the 
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source is a senior auditor on the audit team. Hirst (1994), on the other hand, compares 
sources low and high in objectivity using evidence from another auditor and the CFO. 
His results suggest that the competence of the source impacts auditors’ judgments of 
evidence persuasiveness only when the source is another auditor on the audit team. These 
results imply that management information, which is about a source low in objectivity, 
would have little influence on auditor’s judgments. Alternatively, other audit research 
suggests management information impacts the persuasiveness of evidence when the 
source is low in objectivity. Anderson, Koonce, and Marchant (1994) find the 
competence of the source impacts auditors’ assessment of the likelihood management’s 
explanation accounted for all of the unusual fluctuation. They deem the explanation more 
likely to account for the fluctuation when management is high in competence. Along with 
these mixed results in the accounting literature, psychology literature documents mixed 
conclusions on the impact of the content of management information on persuasion (e.g. 
McGinnies & Ward 1980; Wilson & Sherrell 1993).  
Although these prior studies find mixed results, there has been a shift in the 
regulatory environment, which has influenced auditors’ approach to evaluating evidence. 
Auditors have gone from being primarily self-regulated to being regulated by an 
independent third party, the PCAOB. With the institution of the PCAOB, inspections 
have been made a regular part of the oversight process. These inspections call out audit 
firms for failure to properly document their procedures and exercise professional 
skepticism (Church & Shefchik 2012; Hermanson et al. 2007). There is evidence that the 
current regulatory environment has made auditors more skeptical in approaching 
evidence evaluation. Indeed, results of a recent study suggest that auditors in current 
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practice are approaching the audit with presumptive doubt professional skepticism. 
Presumptive doubt skepticism essentially means that auditors distrust management due to 
their inherent bias or lack of objectivity (Quadackers et al. 2014).  
Along with the change in auditors’ approach to evaluating evidence, auditing 
standards require that evidence acquired through management inquiry must be 
corroborated with additional documentation to support management assertions (PCAOB 
2010c). Therefore, management’s response alone should not be enough to influence an 
auditor’s judgment, regardless of the content of management information. Because of the 
increased oversight from the PCAOB, auditors are even more likely today to ensure 
appropriate evidence has been documented. Taken together, the regulatory changes have 
led auditors to be less likely to accept management inquiry evidence due to the 
management’s lack of objectivity and, hence, less influenced by the content of 
management information. 
The current study differs from the prior research in that it investigates the 
presence and absence of management information rather than its content. Because recent 
research indicates that the content of management information should not influence 
auditor’s judgments, I include both positive and negative management information, to 
ensure this expectation is correct. However, because audit standards require this 
information, the current study investigates the influence that just the presence of this 
information has on auditors’ processing of the information.  
2.3 Communication Channels in Accounting Decision Making 
Few studies have investigated communication channel and its impact on 
judgments in auditing. This is surprising as the channel through which communication 
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can occur varies widely. Although there is limited research on the impact of 
communication channel in a management inquiry setting, there is evidence in other 
accounting contexts which indicate that the communication channel affects individuals’ 
judgments.  
The overarching theme of these studies in accounting is that the channel of 
communication does matter. Therefore, ignoring the channel of communication may 
result in incomplete conclusions. Management, investors, and auditors all have been 
found to change their judgments depending on the communication channel. In a 
negotiation setting, management is likely to offer more biased evidence when auditors 
communicate through email as opposed to visual and audio channels. This occurs 
because management feels less accountable and cooperative when communicating 
through a written channel versus face-to-face (Saiewitz & Kida 2014). Further, non-
professional investors’ trust in management, and their subsequent investment decisions, 
vary depending on the channel through which management communicates (Elliott, 
Hodge, & Sedor 2012). Auditors are also affected by the channel of communication. Staff 
auditors have been shown to request more evidence when email communication is 
available to them (Bennett & Hatfield 2012). This avoidance of communicating face-to-
face is due to staff auditors feeling uncomfortable when having to communicate with 
more experienced, older client management. These studies show that individuals in 
accounting contexts, including auditors, are sensitive to the communication channel. 
However, current accounting literature has yet to investigate the influence of 




 This lack of research on the impact of communication channel on auditor’s 
judgments is especially troubling as auditors believe that communicating face-to-face 
with the client gives them additional insight when dealing with possible deception as 
compared to written means.  Research suggests that audio cues are an important 
component that auditors use to evaluate the credibility of management (Comunale, 
Sexton, & Sincich 2005).  In addition, survey responses from seniors through partner 
auditors specify: 
 …the manner in which the client responds is an important cue when judging the 
validity of the response. If client personnel do not have an immediate and 
convincing explanation (e.g., they hesitate or hedge in their response), auditors 
indicate they are more skeptical about the client’s response than if the client’s 
explanation comes quickly and convincingly (Hirst & Koonce 1996, pp. 472-
473). 
Further, most auditors rely on cues they receive from communication with the client as it 
relates to the risk of misstatement:  
And often times you can find out…by sitting down, looking them in the eye and 
asking them a question. If you get a blank stare that probably tells you you’ve got 
a control problem because they are not even aware of it (Trompeter & Wright 
2010, p. 691). 
 These responses indicate how important audio and visual cues are to auditors as 
they assess the validity of evidence. Notwithstanding, research indicates that auditors are 
likely unable to identify deception at a rate statistically greater than chance, even when 
trained to detect such deception (Lee & Welker 2007).  Indeed, Ekman and O’Sullivan 
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(1991) find results that indicate only professionals in the secret service are able to predict 
deceit better than chance. Further, evidence suggests that auditors put too much focus on 
client characteristics and fail to consider the content of the inquiry leading to inaccurate 
risk assessments (Wilks & Zimbelman 2004). My study is designed to systematically 
investigate whether auditors’ judgments of evidence persuasiveness differ depending on 
the channel of communication. Furthermore, as discussed in the following chapter, there 
is reason to believe an interaction exists between management information and 
communication channel. My study addresses this potential interactive effect. 
2.4 Dual Process Theories 
 Management inquiry is an opportunity for management to persuade the auditor 
that the information provided is without error or misstatement. However, management is 
not necessarily trying to deceive the auditor.3 Quite the contrary, in the majority of 
instances management believes their numbers to be accurate based on their recordkeeping 
and judgments. Thus, they simply want to provide auditors with persuasive evidence as to 
why the information provided is accurate.  
 Dual process theories to understand how individuals process a persuasive 
message, as in management inquiry. The elaboration likelihood model (ELM) (Petty & 
Cacioppo 1986) suggests that the extent to which a person considers and evaluates the 
relevant arguments in a message varies depending on individual and situational factors 
that affect the motivation and ability to process such arguments. The level of thought 
about relevant information, or elaboration, in persuasive arguments can range from no 
thought about relevant arguments (low elaboration) to complete thought and 
                                                 
3 In some instances management may be trying to deceive the auditor; however, I do not focus on such 
instances due to the low likelihood of occurrence in practice. 
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incorporation of those arguments into attitudes (high elaboration). Although the amount 
of elaboration can vary along a continuum from low to high, the process is divided into 
two persuasion routes. When the central route is taken, attitude change is the result of 
high cognitive effort in which all of the factors relevant to the persuasive message are 
evaluated. The peripheral route is taken when an individual has low motivation and 
ability to consider relevant information. When the peripheral route is taken, attitude 
change is not based on the content of the persuasive arguments, but instead using little 
cognitive effort by taking short cuts (Petty & Cacioppo 1986).  
2.4.1 Central Route Processing 
The central processing route is taken when an individual is motivated and has the 
ability to consider the arguments relevant to a message, using a significant amount of 
cognitive effort to evaluate the message. This evaluation focuses on the content of the 
message, with non-content cues, such as characteristics of the source, having minimal 
influence (Chaiken 1980). This means that message-specific characteristics, such as 
argument strength and plausibility, have the most influence on an individual’s judgment, 
leading to a judgment that is thoroughly evaluated and supported (Petty & Wegener 
1998a). Because individuals cannot always exert high effort, different situations lead to 
differing levels of cognitive effort. With that said, auditors are professionals tasked in 
making high quality judgments. Because central route processing leads to higher quality 
judgments (Bonner 1999, p. 276), auditors are expected to exhibit more central route 
processing.   
There are various methods of central route processing that lead to effortful 
evaluation of the arguments presented (Petty & Wegener 1998a). Of these methods, 
auditors are most likely to use information integration. Information integration theory 
16 
 
indicates that individuals identify different information units that must be integrated into 
a judgment. Individuals then put forth high levels of effort to determine the weight each 
piece of evidence should receive (Anderson 1971). Consistent with audit standards 
(PCAOB 2010b), auditors should take all relevant pieces of evidence and incorporate 
them into their judgments based on the importance of each in satisfying management 
assertions. Auditors should therefore incorporate all of the information received, 
including the management information, and weight it according to its importance in 
making judgments. If auditors are using central route processing, their judgments should 
be influenced by the quality of the management’s explanation with minimal influence of 
the content of management information.  
2.4.2 Peripheral Route Processing 
Peripheral processing refers to low elaboration methods of evaluating a persuasive 
message. These low effort methods lead to judgements that are not based on a thorough 
evaluation of relevant information (Petty & Wegener 1998a) and, therefore, can be of 
lower quality.4 Heuristics are a low elaboration process most likely impacting auditor 
judgments with the presence of management information. Heuristics are intuitive simple 
rules that require little thought and effort to use when motivation and ability to process 
information is low (Chaiken 1980; Kahneman & Frederick 2002; Petty & Cacioppo 
1986).  
Heuristics are knowledge structures that influence individual judgments. In order 
for a heuristic to influence an individual’s judgment it must be stored in memory, 
                                                 
4 There may be some cognitive shortcuts that are as effective and at times more effective than high 
cognitive effort. However, in the long run low cognitive effort produces lower quality judgments than high 
cognitive effort processing.  
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activated or accessed from memory, and applicable to the judgment goal. Activation of a 
heuristic can occur through either recent exposure or accessing it from memory through a 
situational trigger (Kahneman & Frederick 2002). For example, a situational trigger may 
be glasses. When an individual interacts with someone wearing glasses, it may trigger a 
heuristic used to assess that individual as intelligent. An example of a heuristic from 
recent exposure may be an anecdote about recent plane crashes. Such recent exposure 
may lead an individual to believe flying is more dangerous than driving.  
The predictions of the current study are based on management information, being 
provided or not, prior to a neutral communication with management. The following 
section describes how management information fits into the dual process theories 
framework, by prompting the use of a heuristic. It also describes how the communication 
channel interacts with management information by either promoting or discouraging 









3.1 The Effect of Communication Channel 
Social psychology studies research the impact of the channel of communication in 
persuasive communications. These studies primarily find that video communication 
intensifies the characteristics of the person during the communication due to the presence 
of peripheral cues. Therefore, individuals’ ability to use simple heuristics of the person as 
a determinant of opinion change when communicating through video increases.  
A stream of literature by Chaiken and colleagues find differences in 
communication channels as it interacts with other variables when investigating 
individuals’ opinion change. In the first study in this stream of literature, the impact of 
communication channel on the persuasiveness of the message differs depending on the 
complexity of the message. When the message is complex, the written channel is most 
persuasive, whereas when the message is easy to understand, the video channel is most 
persuasive (Chaiken & Eagly 1976). This is due to the comprehension of the message. 
When the message is difficult to comprehend, individuals are more persuaded when they 
can understand the message fully, which the written channel provides the ability to 
process the information with more focus on the message. However, in a video, there is 
more peripheral cues, making it more difficult to focus on message. When the message is 
easier to comprehend, the individuals are more influence by the likeability of the 
individual, which is assessed using the salient peripheral cues that are provided in the 
video communication. More closely related to the current study, Chaiken and Eagly  
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(1983) find that individuals focus more on communicator characteristics when exposed to 
video and audio messages versus written ones. Further, the opinion change in the video 
and audio conditions were consistent with their assessments of the source, indicative of 
using heuristics of the source when processing the message. 
Andreoli and Worchel (1978) study communication channels along with 
individuals of different levels of source trustworthiness. The communication channel was 
found to interact with trustworthiness. Video lead to the most opinion change for the 
most trustworthy source and was least effective for the least trustworthy source. The 
results indicate that the trustworthiness was made more salient and was used as a 
heuristic in assessing the individuals change in opinion. It’s important to note that in 
these psychology studies with differences in trustworthiness and likeability, the 
differences between the communicators was made even more salient in the video 
communication (i.e. the trustworthy communicator is depicted as a newscaster, the 
untrustworthy communicator is depicted as a politician). Therefore, even though the 
delivery of the message is the same, the video communication make this difference 
apparent. However, in the current study, the various levels of competence is not changed 
(i.e., I do not vary the title of the individual as well) therefore, the video communication 
does not make this descriptor more salient. Therefore I would expect no differential 
impact of this variable.  
Social psychology studies would suggest the channel of communication in 
persuasive communication would lead to differential processing, peripheral processing in 
the video condition and central processing under the written communication. However, I 
do not expect this effect in the current study. This is because of the differences in context 
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between the social psychology studies and those in an auditing context. Individuals in the 
social psychology studies are being persuaded on their opinion. Whereas auditors are 
being persuaded on their professional judgment. Therefore, auditors are held accountable 
for the decisions they make, which is not captured in the prior social psychology studies. 
Recall that the route used by an individual depends on both the individual’s motivation 
and ability (Petty & Cacioppo 1986). Auditors are high motivation individuals due to the 
accountability and therefore are more likely to default to processing the information using 
the central route (see Bonner 1999). However, as discussed below, when auditors are 
provided management information, their unconscious goals change, leading to a different 
effect of communication channel.  
3.2 The Effect of Management Information 
Auditors today are less likely to alter their judgments of evidence persuasiveness 
purely based on differences in management information (see Quadackers et al. 2014). 
However, social psychology literature indicates there are instances when individuals 
attribute source characteristics for their overall judgments without being aware of it. This 
occurs when trait adjectives, such as management information, are provided to an 
individual (Higgins & Bargh 1987, p. 374).  
The presence of such information activates a new goal of assessing the 
characteristics of the source (Higgins et al. 1977) and it focuses the individual to attend to 
the characteristics of the source (Higgins & Bargh 1987; Mae et al. 1999), instead of just 
the message. This research suggests that an auditor will develop a goal of assessing 
management and will focus more on doing so when management information is provided 
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versus when it is not provided. Therefore, auditors will collect more information about 
management, to the extent possible, during management inquiry.  
The extent of information collected is dependent on the channel of 
communication used in management inquiry. When individuals interact directly with 
another, they are more strongly influenced by information received through such direct 
interaction (Wu & Shaffer 1987) versus through description. Indeed, the more accessible 
characteristics of the source are, the more influence they have on an individual’s 
assessment of the source (Higgins & Bargh 1987, p. 374). Auditors will, therefore, make 
an assessment of management’s characteristics depending on the interaction with 
management and will substitute that assessment as a heuristic of the persuasiveness of 
evidence (Carlston & Skowronski 1994). 
3.3 The Joint Effect of Management Information and Communication Channel 
Different communication channels provide varying amounts of information 
regarding the source (Booth‐Butterfield & Gutowski 1993). When auditors are provided 
management information, the heuristic of the source is triggered, leading them to seek out 
information about management during the exchange. Face-to-face communication 
provides cues, which make management characteristics more accessible and lowers the 
ability of an individual to evaluate just the message (Chaiken, Wood, & Eagly 1996). The 
channel then increases the likelihood for peripheral processing, while the management 
information prompts the use of a heuristic during that peripheral processing. Consistent 
with attribute substitution, the personal characteristics provided by the direct 
communication are then used to assess the persuasiveness of the message (Hamilton, 
Katz, & Leirer 1980; Wu & Shaffer 1987).  
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The current study is interested in understanding how neutral communications with 
management (i.e. not overly positive or negative) influence auditor’s judgments. 
Research suggests that individual’s process information conveyed with minimal affect 
with a positivity offset. Indeed, unless an individual comes across as extremely negative, 
at which point individuals process the information with a negative bias, they are likely to 
be perceived in a positive light (Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson 1997). Furthermore, in 
management inquiry, the client can effectively communicate explanations for changes in 
accounts.5 Individuals expect knowledgeable sources (such as client management) to 
have valid arguments, leading them to process their messages with a positive bias 
(Chaiken & Maheswaran 1994). Overall, communication that provides neutral salient 
characteristics from knowledgeable sources, much like that experienced in a management 
inquiry setting, is likely to lead to positive assessments of management. Therefore, 
auditors will assess the evidence as more persuasive, because they substitute their 
assessments of management for their assessments of the evidence. 
When the communication channel lacks management characteristic cues, even 
with management information triggering a goal of assessing management, auditors will 
be unable to further assess management. Furthermore, the lack of cues allows auditors to 
have a high ability to evaluate the message without distraction. Therefore, they will 
assess the evidence systematically, weighting each piece appropriately for the impact it 
should have on their judgment. The content of management information will have little 
influence on the auditors’ evidence persuasiveness judgments due to their presumptive 
doubt professional skepticism, which minimizes the impact of competence information in 
                                                 
5 It is possible for there to be differences in management’s ability to communicate explanations to auditors. 
This is beyond the scope of the current study.  
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light of low objectivity. As management is expected to be assessed more positively under 
face-to-face communication, auditors’ assessments of evidence persuasiveness are 
expected to be higher in face-to-face versus written when management information is 
provided. See Figure 1 for a depiction of this hypotheses.  
  
Figure 1: This figure depicts the theoretical path for the predictions set forth in hypothesis 1a. It depicts the 
paths of processing that arises when management information is provided and management inquiry occurs 
through written and face-to-face communication.  
 
If auditors are not provided management information, no clear heuristic of the 
source is triggered. The salience of management characteristics are likely not sufficient 
for auditors to use a heuristic of the person, especially due to the high motivation auditors 
feel towards an auditing task (Bonner 1999). In turn, auditors will take the central route 
for processing information (high elaboration), evaluating the message systematically. 
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Consequently, face-to-face and written communication are not expected to differ when 
management information is not provided. See figure 2 for a depiction of this hypotheses.  
 
 
Figure 2: This figure depicts the theoretical path for the predictions set forth in hypothesis 1b. This panel 
depicts the path of processing that arises when no management information is provided for management 
inquiry that occurs through both face-to-face and written communication. 
 
I predict the above interaction in two the formally stated hypotheses below. 
 
Hypothesis 1a: When management information is provided, auditors will 
assess the persuasiveness of evidence higher under face-to-face versus 
written communication. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: When the management information is not provided, 
auditors will not assess the persuasiveness of evidence differently under 


















4.1 Design Overview 
 A 2x2 between-participants experiment is used to test my hypotheses. I 
manipulate communication channel (written versus video) and management information 
(provided versus not provided). Participants are asked to perform analytical procedures as 
part of an audit engagement, similar to Anderson et al. (1994), and tasked with 
investigating an unusual fluctuation. Prior to receiving the explanation, management 
information is provided, or not. In the task, the assistant controller provides auditors with 
an explanation for the unusual fluctuation from the client’s assistant controller. The 
explanation comes to the participants through either a video or email communication. To 
measure auditors’ assessed persuasiveness of the explanation, I collect their judgments of 
the likelihood of material misstatement in the affected accounts before and after being 
given the explanation. I also ask participants to document all they can remember about 
the message and the assistant controller as well as answer questions about the assistant 
controller’s personal characteristics to help in capturing the cognitive process auditors 
use to evaluate the evidence.  
4.2 Experimental Procedure 
 Prior to performing any procedures, all participants are asked to view a video of 
the assistant controller (i.e. management) introducing himself. This video is provided to 
all participants, regardless of their condition to ensure that all participants are provided 
with the same information about the assistant controller’s physical appearance and verbal 
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cues.6 Accordingly, any differences between the channel of communication conditions 
are directly related to the channel used to communicate the evidence.7 Participants then 
receive background information about a first-year client and are asked to calculate 
financial ratios as part of analytical procedures. They are asked to calculate financial 
ratios as part of analytical procedures because it helps auditors feel more invested in the 
task (see Anderson et al. 1994), and therefore more accountable for their performance. 
Participants are then directed toward an unexpected increase in gross margin from the 
prior year and asked to assess the likelihood that the accounts are materially misstated 
(referred to as the “prior probability”).  
 Next, participants in the “management information provided” condition are 
provided with a brief background about the assistant controller, including experience in 
accounting and prior training. Participants in the “management information not provided” 
condition do not receive any background about the assistant controller. Participants then 
receive a video or written message, depending on their communication channel condition, 
with the client’s explanation for the unexpected fluctuation. The explanation is that the 
unusual increase in gross margin is due to a change in sales mix. The explanation should 
appear plausible, as the change in sales mix is consistent with the ratio fluctuation (Libby 
& Frederick 1990)  and not suggestive of an error or misstatement.  
 After the message is presented, participants are asked to assess the likelihood that 
the accounts are materially misstated (referred to as the “posterior probability”). 
Participants then evaluate the assistant controller on several dimensions (e.g. friendly, 
                                                 
6 I confirm participants viewed the video by asking them to record who is in the video and what is said. All 
participants responded correctly. 
7 The inclusion of the video in both conditions is conservative, giving everyone an idea of the assistant 
controller’s appearance and mannerisms. 
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objective, trustworthy, sincere, etc.) and provide demographic information. See Table 1 
below for a timeline of the task. 
 
Table 1: Task Timeline 
 
4.2.2 Independent Variables 
 The two independent variables of interest are communication channel and 
management information. These variables are manipulated randomly between 
participants. Communication channel is manipulated using a video or written explanation 
1. Participants receive background on company and task, introduced to the assistant 
controller – all participants view the same video 
2. Participants are asked to perform analytical procedures, attention is directed to 
unusual fluctuation in gross margin 
3. Participants assess the likelihood that the accounts are materially misstated 
[prior likelihood] 
4. Participants are provided description of the assistant controller (management 
information manipulation) 
5. Participants are provided the explanation from the assistant controller explaining 
unusual fluctuation (channel of communication manipulation) 
6. Participants assess the likelihood that the accounts are materially misstated 
[post likelihood] 
7. Participants fill out additional measures and demographic information 
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for the unexpected fluctuation in the gross margin ratio. In the video condition, an actor 
portrays the assistant controller and explains the reason for the fluctuation. The written 
communication is an email sent by the assistant controller explaining the fluctuation. In 
all conditions, the content of the message is exactly the same with the dialogue of the 
video precisely matching the content of the written message. This design choice, along 
with a video being provided to all participants, ensures the only difference across 
conditions is the channel by which the message is communicated. The video allows me to 
operationalize face-to-face communication, while ensuring that all participants receive 
identical information in the same manner.  
 Although there are differences in face-to-face and video communications, the 
presence of salient personal characteristics are consistent, and if anything, dampened in 
the video communication. Face-to-face communication may result in stronger results 
although it would be at the sacrifice of introducing other possible confounds (e.g. 
variations in interactions that cannot be controlled for in face-to-face communication). I 
avoid this potential confound by using the same video for all participants. This 
manipulation choice does not impact the theory I am testing. I am focused on the ability 
to convey visual and audio cues, which video does. 
 Management information is manipulated by including or omitting information 
about management’s training and experience (i.e. competence) from the experimental 
materials. When information is included, participants are provided with one of the 
following: 
“Consensus from others within your engagement team regarding the Assistant 




“Consensus from others within your engagement team regarding the Assistant 
Controller is that he has limited formal training and little experience in 
accounting” 
I provide two variations of management information, consistent with prior literature on 
source reliability. Because I am investigating a management inquiry setting, and the 
client is consistently deemed to be low in objectivity, I provide information about the 
management’s competence. To avoid differences being due to the valence of competence 
information (i.e. highly competent sources are more reliable), I manipulate management 
competence information to include both low and high competence. Although competence 
was assessed differently between these two conditions, consistent with my theory above, 
I make no predictions on differences between these two conditions. Furthermore, because 
there were no significant differences between them, I collapse these cells in the data 
analyses. 
4.2.3 Dependent Measures 
 The dependent measure of interest in this study is the persuasiveness of evidence. 
I use the log likelihood ratio to operationalize this measure. The log likelihood ratio 
measures the perceived persuasiveness of the evidence (i.e., the assistant controller’s 
explanation) by incorporating both the diagnosticity of the evidence and the reliability of 
the client. Using the prior and posterior probabilities elicited from participants, the log 
likelihood ratio (X*) is calculated following the likelihood formula adapted from Hirst 
(1994), as derived from cascaded inference theory. 
 Cascaded inference theory uses probabilities to determine the inferential value 
that is associated with a report of an event or data as support for a hypothesis. The 
adjusted likelihood ratio is the probability of a given hypothesis, H1, being true given 
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report, D*, over the probability of the mutually exclusive hypothesis, H2, being true given 




This definition is derived from Bayes theorem and can be used to incorporate the 







The reliability of the source can be seen in terms of the probability of an accurate report, 
P(D*|H∩D) and P(D*|H∩D) (the probability that the source reports D* when actual 
event D occurred)  as well as the probability of an inaccurate report, P(D*|H∩D	) and 
P(D*|H∩D	) (the probability that the source reports D* when the actual event D	 
occurred) (Schum & Du Charme 1971). 
 The log likelihood is calculated as follows:  
Posterior Probability x (1 – Prior Probability) 
(1 – Posterior Probability) x Prior Probability 
 
The X* is used to determine the inferential value participants assign to the explanation 
provided: X* closer to zero have less inferential value. I use this measure as opposed to a 
simple difference measure to ensure increases and decreases in probabilities are evaluated 
equally and properly represent the persuasiveness of the message. 
 I collect two different types of processing measures to determine the route of 
processing taken by the auditors: their recall of the message and management and a 
Likert-scale measure of management characteristics. First, participants are asked to list 
everything they can recall about management and the message. Auditors should 
demonstrate more recall of management when processing the evidence using heuristics 
X* = – ln 
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(Chaiken & Eagly 1983). Next, auditors are asked to assess the characteristics of the 
assistant controller on the following traits: friendly, objective, trustworthy, sincere, 
competent, warm, intelligent, likeable, approachable, motivated to be accurate, and 
reliable. The Likert scale asks participants to indicate to what extent the characteristics 
are like the assistant controller, anchored by 1 = “not at all like him” and 5 = “just like 
him”. Auditors should find the assistant controller more like these positive traits, 
consistent with their persuasiveness judgments, when they are processing the message 
heuristically.  
 Lastly, participants are asked several questions to ensure the message was realistic 
and they understood the task. They were asked how plausible the explanation was (0 = 
not plausible at all to 10 = completely plausible). It should be expected that they find the 
message plausible with an assessment greater than the mid-point. They also were asked 
how difficult/easy the explanation was to understand (1 = very difficult to 7 = very easy) 
and how confident they are in their judgment (0 = not confident at all to 10 = completely 
confident). There should be no differences between conditions on these measures. See 









 One hundred twenty-two senior auditors from three Big 4 firms and four national 
public accounting firms participated in the study as part of the Center for Audit Quality’s 
Access to Audit Personnel Program.8 The instrument was distributed by firm 
representatives through a link using Qualtrics Survey Software. Senior auditors are 
appropriate participants because they typically interact with management throughout the 
audit and, specifically, during analytical procedures (Hirst & Koonce 1996). Participants 
were randomly assigned as they accessed the survey to one of four experimental 
conditions. Participants are 66 percent male and on average 27 years old (median, 26) 
with a mean of 39 (median 36) months of work experience. There were no significant 












                                                 
8 The participation request was made for 150 senior auditors prior to busy season. However, 16 participants 
recruited were audit staff or managers. Further, 13 senior auditor participants from one firm completed the 
instrument after busy season (four months after the rest of the participants). Due to significant effects of 
rank and firm in my overall analyses, I exclude these participants from the tabulated results. The inclusion 
of these participants does not change the pattern of the results and overall conclusions are unchanged.  
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Table 2: Demographics 
  
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Age 23 47 27 3.194 
Months Worked 7* 190 39 22.430 
*This individual is an outlier, in that all other participants have over a year’s worth of experience. Although 
I cannot verify why this person has only seven months worked, the individual reported an age of 32 and 
therefore may have been promoted to senior due to their past work experience. Further, this individual was 
excluded from the analyses below due to failing a manipulation check. 
 














































 Video Written Video Written Test Statistic P-Value 
Sex* 0.67 0.60 0.72 0.71 1.21 0.750 
* Numbers reported are the proportion of males in the given cell 
 






 Video Written Video Written Test Statistic P-Value 
Firm A 7 5 3 3   
Firm B 3 5 2 2   
Firm C 7 5 3 3   
Firm D 0 1 1 0   
Non-Big4 17 16 9 8   
Firm E 9 9 4 7   
Firm F 6 8 2 4   
Firm G 7 8 3 5 5.608* 0.998 
Big4 22 25 9 16 1.361+ 0.715 
*Test is for differences in the number of participants in each cell across firms. Not significant as df = 18. 




5.2 Manipulation Checks 
 I use two manipulation checks to ensure that participants acquired the information 
in the message consistently across the communication channel conditions. First, I ask 
participants to identify the reason for the unusual increase in gross margin from the 
Assistant Controller giving them the following choices: higher per unit sales price, 
change in sales mix, or lower per unit expenses. Only three participants failed this 
manipulation check question, with no significant differences between the communication 
channel conditions (χ2 = 0.492, p = 0.598 using Fisher’s exact test). Further, participants 
in the management information condition were asked how the assistant controller was 
depicted in the case materials, given the following options: the assistant controller is well 
trained and has extensive experience in accounting and the assistant controller has limited 
formal training and little experience in accounting.9 Four participants failed the 
manipulation check question with no significant differences between the channel 
conditions (χ2 = 1.257, p = 0.343 using Fisher’s exact test). Participants who failed either 
manipulation check were removed from further analyses, but retaining their responses 
does not change the results. 
 
Table 3: Manipulation Check Questions, Chi-Square Tests of Proportion 
 Video Written Test 
Statistic 
P-Value 
Explanation Content* 0.035 0.015 0.492 0.598 
Management Information* 0.053 0.015 1.257 0.343 
* Numbers reported are the proportion of individuals in the given cell that failed each manipulation check. 
                                                 




Next, participants were asked to assess the plausibility of the assistant controller’s 
explanation. To ensure that the explanation is perceived as plausible, I test whether 
participants’ mean responses to this question are significantly higher than the mid-point 
of the scale (six). The mean response of 7.63 is significantly higher than the scale 
midpoint (t = 8.20, p < 0.001) and there are no significant differences between the 
communication channel conditions (t = 0.699, p = 0.486) or the management information 
conditions (t = 1.092, p = 0.277).10 
 




































Test of Scale 
Midpoint 
   8.20+ <0.001 
* Test compares the Management Information Conditions 
**Test compares the video and written conditions 
+ Test compares the total mean to the mid-point of the scale, six. 
 
 
5.3 Evidence Persuasiveness 
 Once participants are directed to investigate the significant increase in profit 
margin, they are asked to make a judgment of how likely the accounts in question are 
materially misstated. Participants’ responses represent a measure of their prior likelihood 
                                                 
10 As a robustness test, I remove all responses that reported the plausibility of the explanation below the 
midpoint (6.1% of them) and re-run my main analyses. My conclusions remain unchanged. 
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assessment. Because this assessment is made prior to any experimental manipulations, 
there should be no difference in prior likelihoods between conditions. Indeed, I find that 
the prior likelihood does not differ between experimental conditions (F = 0.367, p = 
0.777).  
 











Mean 0.389 0.353 0.400 0.338 0.367 0.777 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.200 0.265 0.195 0.199   
Median 0.400 0.290 0.420 0.345 1.167 0.762 
 
 
Participants are then provided background information about the assistant 
controller (management information condition) as well as the explanation for the 
significant increase in profit margin either in a video or written email. After participants 
receive the explanation, they are asked to again assess how likely the accounts in 
question are materially misstated. This response measures auditors’ post likelihood 
assessment. I use the prior and post likelihoods, as described in the methods chapter 
above, to calculate the likelihood ratio, taking the log to ensure changes in assessed 
likelihood of material misstatement are analyzed equally.11 Along with the parametric 
                                                 
11 Due to the nature of the likelihood ratio, increases and decreases of equal distance are calculated as 
different amounts when just the likelihood ratio is calculated. The log normalizes the ratio, leading to 
increases and decreases in likelihood to be equal in amount (although positive and negative, respectively). I 
transform the initial prior and post likelihood measures by adding one to ensure no observations are lost 
37 
 
tests, I report nonparametric results for robustness because X* is not normally distributed. 
Conclusions remain the same across tests and the pattern of means and medians are 
consistent.  
 My hypotheses predict that when management information is provided, evidence 
will be more persuasive when communicated in a video as compared to in writing. By 
comparison, no difference in evidence persuasiveness is expected between 
communication channel when no management information is provided. To test the 
interaction predicted with H1a and H1b, I perform an ANOVA. I expect a significant 
interaction between the two independent variables, management information and 
communication channel.  Consistent with my predictions, I find a marginally significant 




















                                                 
due to no change in likelihoods when the log is taken. Further, the log likelihood ratio is multiplied by 
negative one so that positive amounts indicate that auditors’ evaluate the assistant controller’s explanation 
as being more persuasive for ease of analysis. Note that 30% of responders reported no change in 





Table 6: Log Likelihood Ratio Results 
 











35 17 52 
Min ˗ 1.77 ˗ 0.96 ˗ 1.77 
Max 3.24 1.70 3.24 
Mean 0.56 0.25 0.46 
Median 0.296 0.041 0.279 
SD 1.04 0.70 0.95 
N 
Written 
39 24 63 
Min ˗ 1.40 ˗ 2.00 ˗ 2.00 
Max 3.70 4.64 4.64 
Mean 0.18 0.39 0.26 
Median 0.026 0.114 0.060 
SD 0.91 1.18 1.02 
N 
Overall 
74 41  
Min ˗ 1.77 ˗ 2.00  
Max 3.70 4.64  
Mean 0.36 0.33  
Median 0.098 0.106  
SD 0.99 1.00  
 
Panel B: Results of ANOVA 
        df F-Ratio           P-value  
Intercept       1 23.771            <0.000 
Management Information     1   0.074   0.787 
Communication Channel     1   0.390   0.533 
Management Information x Communication Channel 1   1.705              0.097* 
 
Panel C: Results of Planned T-Test Comparisons  
        Test-Statistic            P-value 
Management Information, video > written   1.650   0.051* 
No Management Information, video = written   ˗ 0.414   0.681 
 
Panel D: Results of Planned Mann Whitney Tests 
        Test-Statistic            P-value 
Management Information, video > written   1.893   0.029* 
No Management Information, video = written   ˗ 0.148   0.882 
 






Figure 3: Persuasiveness Judgment Results. This figure depicts the pattern of results for the main 
dependent measure, the log likelihood ratio(X*), which is used to estimate the persuasiveness of the 
evidence. Consistent with H1a and H1b, there is a marginally significant interaction between management 
information and communication channel (p = 0.07, one tailed). Consistent with H1a, there is a significant 
difference in the persuasiveness of evidence between written and video communication when management 
information is provided (p = 0.05, one tailed). Consistent with H1b, there is no significant difference 




 Although I find significant results for the interaction effect predicted by my two 
hypotheses, I further validate the predicted pattern by testing H1a and H1b separately. 
H1a predicts that when management information is provided, video communication leads 
to higher assessed persuasiveness versus written communication. To test H1a, I compare 
the simple main effects between those with management information provided. I expect 
to see a significant difference between the video and email conditions when management 







































for the main dependent measure, X*. When management information is provided there is 
a significant difference between channels. Auditors in the video condition find the 
explanation more persuasive than those in the email condition (t = 1.65, p-value = 0.051; 
z = 1.893, p-value = 0.029, both one tailed). This result is consistent with H1a. H1b 
predicts that when management information is not provided, there is no difference 
between the communication channels. I find that when management information is not 
provided, there is no significant difference in persuasiveness of the message between 
channels (t = -0.414, p = 0.341 z = ˗ 0.148, p-value = 0.882). This result is consistent 









6.1 Heuristic Processing Analysis 
 The predictions of this study are based on the idea that management information 
will activate the use of a heuristic when processing the message. The activation of the 
heuristic will lead auditors to focus more on assessing management during the 
management inquiry communication. Auditors will then use their assessments of 
management personnel as a heuristic for the persuasiveness of the evidence. I perform 
several supplemental analyses to validate this. First, I test whether a heuristic of the 
source was indeed activated by the management information. I then test whether the 
judgments auditors make on evidence persuasiveness are consistent with their 
assessments of the assistant controller. Lastly, I use path analysis to determine whether 
the assessments of management characteristic mediate the relationship between 
communication channel and evidence persuasiveness.  
6.1.1 Recall of Management and Message 
 The first step in understanding whether a heuristic of the source is triggered is to 
test whether it is triggered when management information is provided. I use an analysis 
similar to prior literature to determine whether a message is evaluated systematically or 
heuristically (Chaiken & Eagly 1983). Theory indicates that heuristics can be activated 
by recent exposure. Therefore, I expect auditors in the management information 
condition to be prompted to focus on the source of the evidence more, with a goal of 
assessing management’s characteristics. After their post likelihood assessments, I ask the 
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auditor participants to record everything they can recall about the message and the 
person. These free responses are coded by two independent coders who are blind to the 
manipulations. Responses were coded as items about the person, the message, or other. 
Inter-rater reliability was 70 percent, and the coders reconciled any inconsistencies.  
 To determine whether the individuals are more likely to use heuristics about the 
person, I evaluate two different variables. First, I code each observation as either 
mentioning something about the person or not (frequency), allowing me to determine the 
number of individuals in each condition who focused on management during their 
collection of evidence. Second, I evaluate the proportion of mentions of the person to 
mentions of the message. This variable provides me with the proportion of time or effort 
that the auditors spent on evaluating management versus the evidence in each condition. 
Consistent with a heuristic of the source being triggered when management information 
is provided, I expect to see that those auditors under the management information 
condition will be more likely to mention management (frequency), and focus on the 











Table 7: Evaluation of Recall of Management and Message 
Panel A: Frequency of Mentions of Management 
 
Management Information 
n = 74 
No Management Information 
n = 41 
Number Proportion Number Proportion 
Video 15 0.429 6 0.353 
Written 20 0.513 2 0.083 
     
Total 35 0.473* 8 0.195* 
* Chi-square test of proportions finds those in the management information condition are significantly 
more likely to mention the person delivering the message χ2 = 8.700, p = 0.001, one tailed. 
 
Panel B: Proportion of Mentions about Management 
 
 Management Information No Management Information 




Video 0.171 0.232 0.153 0.218 
Written 0.216 0.237 0.033 0.117 
     
Total 0.195+ 0.234 0.083+ 0.174 
+ t-statistic = 2.911, p = 0.002, one tailed. 
 
 
 The results of these analyses indicate a significant difference between the 
management information conditions in both the frequency of auditors who mention 
management (χ2 = 8.700, p = 0.001, one tailed) and the mean proportion of mentions of 
management to the message (t-statistic = 2.911, p = 0.002, one tailed). Further there is no 
significant difference between the video and written condition when management 
information is provided (χ2 = 0.525, p = 0.469; t-statistic = 0.827 , p = 0.411, both two 
tailed). These results indicate that regardless of the channel of communication used, 
auditors are more likely to focus on management as is the predicted effect of the 
inclusion of management information. Further, there is a significant difference between 
the communication channel conditions, with auditors in the video condition being more 
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likely to mention management (χ2 = 4.606, p =0.032, two tailed) and also a higher mean 
percentage of mentions of management (t-statistic = 2.058, p-value = 0.051, two tailed). 
This result is indicative of the effect of channel of communication. Without being 
prompted to focus on management through management information, those 
communicating face-to-face are given more cues about management, leading them to 
have a higher recall of them.  
 These results are indicative of the path auditors take to evaluate the message: 
those who are provided with management information are likely to focus more on 
management. However, even if more information is collected (as measured through 
recall) about management, the impact of the information on auditors’ evidence 
persuasiveness judgments is still unknown. Therefore, I further test how auditors assess 
management depending on their condition. In the next section I evaluate the differences 
in auditors’ assessments of management. 
6.1.2 Assessments of Management 
 Chaiken and Eagly (1983) indicate that recipients of videotaped messages base 
their opinions primarily on their assessment of the communicator, with less influence 
from the message. Further, my theory relies on the fact that individuals will use heuristic 
processing based on the personal attributes when primed by management information. 
For heuristic processing to lead to a higher assessment of the persuasiveness of evidence, 
auditors’ assessments of the client should be more positive in the video communication 
when management information is provided. After participants make their judgments of 
evidence persuasiveness, they are asked to assess the assistant controller on several 
positive adjective scales (friendly, objective, trustworthy, sincere, competent, warm, 
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intelligent, likeable, approachable, motivated to be accurate, reliable). These 
characteristics were assessed by participants after the task was completed and the main 
dependent measures were collected. Participants responded on a likert scale, ranging 
from 1 – “not at all like him” to 5 – “just like him,” how consistent the characteristics 
listed were with the Assistant Controller. Table 8 reports the results of these assessments 
partitioned by the video and email conditions when management information is provided 
and not provided.  
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Table 8: Perceptions of Client between Channels 
 

























































































































































* p < 0.05, one tailed 





The assessments have a consistent trend when management information is provided, 
management is consistently assessed more positively on all characteristics. However, 
when management information is not provided there is no consistent assessment 
differences.  
 To further assess the overall impact of these characteristic assessments on 
evidence persuasiveness, I perform factor analysis on these variables and find they all 
load on one theoretical factor. This factor has an eigenvalue equal to 5.898 and accounts 
for 53.6% of the variance. Based on the predicted interaction, I would expect those 
provided management information will have greater differences between video and 
written communication. More positive assessments of client characteristics are expected 
in the video versus the written condition. I use the new theoretical factor to test the 
differences between the video and email conditions when management information is 
provided and when it is not provided. See Table 9 for Factor analysis results. 
 
Table 9: Factor Analysis 

















Mean 0.161 -0.210 1.54 0.064* 0.041 0.078 -0.12 0.905 
Standard 
Deviation 
1.203 0.798   1.263 0.729   
*Due to directional prediction, one-tailed 
 
The mean factor value is highest when management information is provided and 
communication occurs through video. It is also marginally different from those who are 
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provided management information and received the written message (t = 1.54, p-value = 
0.064, one-tailed). Those who are not provided management information do not assess 
the characteristics of the person any differently between video and email (t=-0.12, p-
value = 0.905). These results are consistent with the auditor’s judgments of evidence 
persuasiveness, which is indicative of the influence their assessments of management has 
on their judgements. 
 The characteristics that the auditor is asked to assess about the assistant controller 
can be further categorized into two groups, those related to the friendliness of the 
assistant controller and those related to the reliability of the assistant controller. The 
reliability characteristics could influence the auditors’ judgments differently than those 
based on friendliness (Chaiken & Eagly 1983). As such, I further separate the 
management characteristics into those friendly characteristics (i.e. friendly, warm, 
sincere, likeable, approachable), and those characteristics related to reliability (i.e. 
objective, trustworthy, competent, intelligent, motivated to be accurate, and reliable), and 
I again use factor analysis and find one factor loads on each of the friendly and reliability 
characteristics, eigenvalue of 3.665 which accounts for 73.3% of the variance and 
eigenvalue of 3.68 which accounts for 61.3% of the variance, respectively. The friendly 
is most different between communication channels when management information is 
provided versus the factor based of the reliability of management (t-statistic = 1.538, p-
value = 0.065, t-statistic = 1.303, p-value = 0.099, one tailed respectively). There is no 
difference between the friendliness and reliability factors between communication 
channels when management information is not provided (t-statistic = 0.096, p-value = 
0.924, t-statistic = -0.257, p-value = 0.799, respectively).  These results further indicate 
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that the difference between auditors’ judgements when management information is 
provided is not based on different assessments of reliability, but instead other 
characteristics that should have no impact on evidence persuasiveness. 
 
Table 10: Factor Analysis, Characteristics Break Out 











































*Due to directional predictions, p-values are one tailed. 
  
 To evaluate the robustness of the above result, I also perform an additional 
analysis comparing the number of individuals who assess the assistant controller more 
positively. I dichotomize the assessments of personality characteristics as either positive, 
greater than the mid-point of 3, or negative, at the midpoint of 3 or lower. I then perform 
chi-squared analysis to determine if those in the management information condition are 
more likely to assess management more positively under the video than written condition. 
Consistent with my theory, I would expect to find more positive assessments of the 
assistant controller on the video condition versus the written condition when management 
information is provided. As indicated in the table, several dimensions were assessed more 
positively by a greater proportion of individuals under this condition. Of the 11 
personality characteristics assessed, four have significant differences. These significant 
differences show a greater proportion of individuals assessing the assistant controller 
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positively under the video versus written condition. Even for those characteristics with 
differences that are not significant, individuals in the video condition consistently assess 
the assistant controller more positively when management information is provided. 
Conversely, when no management information is provided there are no significant 




Table 11: Management Characteristics, Chi Square Tests of Proportion 
 
 Management Information  No Management Information 
 
Video (n=35) Written (n=39) Video (n=17) Written (n=24) 
Number Proportion Number Proportion Number Proportion Number Proportion 
Friendly 16 0.457* 10 0.256* 6 0.353 7 0.292 
Objective 8 0.229 4 0.103 6 0.353 4 0.167 
Trustworthy 6 0.171 7 0.179 3 0.176 5 0.208 
Sincere 11 0.314 9 0.231 7 0.412 7 0.292 
Competent 13 0.371 11 0.282 9 0.529 7 0.292 
Warm 10 0.286** 4 0.103** 4 0.235 5 0.208 
Intelligent 15 0.429 11 0.282 10 0.588 11 0.458 
Likeable 14 0.400 9 0.231 7 0.412 5 0.208 
Approachable 17 0.486 12 0.308 8 0.471 8 0.333 
Motivated to be 
Accurate 
16 0.457** 9 0.231** 10 0.588 10 0.417 
Reliable 12 0.343* 6 0.154* 4 0.235 6 0.250 
* Chi-squared significant at < 0.10, two tailed 
** Chi-squared significant at < 0.05, two tailed
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6.1.3 Path Analysis 
 The analyses above suggest that those provided management information are 
more likely to focus on management characteristics during the collection of evidence. 
Further, when management information is provided, the assessments of management are 
more positive under video versus written communication, with no difference when 
management information is not provided. The pattern of management characteristics 
under the management information condition is consistent with the pattern of evidence 
persuasiveness judgments, indicating that there is more influence of management’s 
characteristics when management information is provided and communication occurs 
through video. I perform a path analysis below to further validate the impact that 
management characteristics have on auditors’ evidence persuasiveness judgments (Baron 
& Kenny 1986). 
 I use the theoretical factors created as part of factor analysis above as the 
dependent measures for management characteristics. I separate out the variables by both 
friendly and reliability based characteristics. Figure 4 reports the p-values for the 4-step 














Figure 4, Panel A: This figure depicts the path analysis for management characteristics. The top 
coefficients are reported for the friendly characteristics and the bottom coefficients are reported for the 
reliability based characteristics. This panel provides the results for the analysis of those in the management 

















Figure 4, Panel B: This figure depicts the path analysis for management characteristics. The top 
coefficients are reported for the friendly characteristics and the bottom coefficients are reported for the 
reliability based characteristics. This panel provides the results for the analysis of those in the no 
management information condition. None of the coefficients are statistically significant.  
 
 
My predictions would expect to find a significant mediation when management 
information is provided (Figure 4, Panel A) and an insignificant mediation when 
management information is not provided (Figure 4, Panel B). When management 




























communication channel is significantly associated with auditors’ persuasiveness 
judgments and both management characteristics. However, step three fails to find a 
significant association between both factors used for management characteristics and the 
persuasiveness of evidence. Step four demonstrates that when each management 
characteristic factor is controller for, the relationship between the communication channel 
and evidence persuasiveness does not become insignificant. When management 
information is not provided, no relationship in the analysis is significant. Therefore, the 
results of the path analysis are inconclusive. Although the pattern of results under the 
management information condition are consistent with expectations, both the friendly and 
reliability based characteristics fail to significantly predict the persuasiveness 
judgments.12 Therefore I am unable to confirm that the differences in persuasiveness 
judgments are due to the difference in management characteristic assessments. 
 
6.2 Big 4 and Non-Big 4 Analysis 
 Although participants from all firms are randomly assigned between conditions 
(see Table 2, Panel D), when the ANOVA from the main hypotheses tests is run 
including a variable categorizing Big 4 and Non-Big 4 firms, that variable becomes 
significant. Further, the significance for the interaction between management information 
and communication channel becomes more significant (F = 3.348, p = 0.035, one tailed) 
and there is a significant interaction between both variables and the Big 4 variable (F = 
3.454, p = 0.066). See Table 12, Panel A for the results of the ANOVA.  
 
                                                 
12 If the one factor that all characteristics load on is used, the results are consistent with the path analysis of 
the two separate factors as reported: the path between management characteristics and evidence 




Table 12: Big 4 and Non-Big 4 Analysis 
Panel A: Results of ANOVA  
        df F-Ratio           P-value  
Intercept       1 18.143            <0.000 
Management Information     1   0.028   0.868 
Communication Channel     1   0.117   0.733 
Big 4        1   8.854   0.004 
Management Information x Communication Channel 1   3.348              0.035* 
Management Information x Big 4    1   0.065   0.800 
Communication Channel x Big 4    1   0.001   0.980 
Management Information x Communication Channel 
x Big 4       1   3.454   0.066 
 
Panel B: Results of Planned T-Test Comparisons, Big 4 
        Test-Statistic            P-value 
Management Information, video > written   0.304   0.381*   
No Management Information, video = written   0.213   0.836 
 
Panel C: Results of Planned T-Test Comparisons, Non-Big 4 
        Test-Statistic            P-value 
Management Information, video > written     1.757   0.045*  
No Management Information, video = written   ˗ 1.084   0.274  
 
*Tests of directional predictions, (interaction and t-test) use one-tailed p-values. 
 
 When the analysis is further broken down to compare the Big 4 versus Non-Big 4 
auditors, the results are intriguing. As can be seen by the t-tests reported in Table 12, 
Panels B and C, the pattern of results is consistent with the hypotheses only in the Non-
Big 4 population. When the population is Non-Big 4, the persuasiveness of evidence is 
assessed more positively when the communication channel is video versus written (t-
statistic = 1.757, p-value = 0.045, one tailed). There is no research to my knowledge that 
speaks specifically to why this pattern would hold most strongly in the Non-Big 4 
population. However, archival literature commonly uses Big 4 as a proxy for a higher 
quality audit, (DeFond, Erkens, & Zhang 2014). The results of this supplemental analysis 
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suggest that Big 4 auditors are less likely to be influenced by the communication channel 
when management information is provided, indicating that the resulting judgment may be 
of higher quality. Indeed, it is reasonable to believe a Big 4 senior auditor may be more 
experienced or vary on personality factors such as trait skepticism which may influence 
their likelihood to use heuristics or motivation in a task. I measure experience using the 
number of months the auditor has worked and measure experience using the Hurtt scale 
for professional skepticism (converted into a percentage). I test the differences in 
experience level and trait skepticism between the Big 4 and Non-Big 4 groups, as 
reported in Table 13.  
 
Table 13: Big 4 and Non-Big 4 Population Differences 
 
As reported above, Big 4 auditors do not have more experience than Non-Big 4 auditors 
(t-statistic = 0.439, p-value = 0.661), but they do have a marginally higher level of trait 
skepticism (t-statistic = 1.691, p-value = 0.094). 
6.3 Management Information Sub Analysis 
 Due to prior research which indicates that auditors are influenced by the content 
of management information (i.e. Anderson et al. 1994), I perform a supplemental analysis 
on the differences between the two manipulations for management information, high and 
low competence. Note that in my analyses up until this point, I collapse these 




















manipulations because I do not predict a difference in evidence persuasiveness between 
them. To further validate the results are based on the effect of the presence of information 
and not the content, I break down the two manipulations in both competence assessments 
as well as evidence persuasiveness (as measured using the log likelihood).  
 Recall that auditors were asked to assess the assistant controller on 11 different 
characteristics. Participants were asked to identify to what extent each characteristic was 
like the Assistant Controller on a scale from 1 – “not at all like him” to 5 – “just like 
him”, with a midpoint of 3. I focus on the competence assessments made by the auditor 
participants to ensure that the content of the manipulation was observed.  
Table 14: Management Information Competence Assessments 
*One tailed due to directional prediction 


























1.853 0.360   
P-Value 
 
0.073 0.721   
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Note that under both the video and written conditions the manipulation of low and high 
competence was observed (t-statistic = 1.768, p-value = 0.043 and t-statistic = 5.478, p-
value <0.001, one tailed respectively). Under the low competence condition, the salient 
management cues presented in the video appear to dampen the effect of the manipulation 
as there is a marginally significant difference between the video and written condition (t-
statistic = 1.853, p-value = 0.073). However, there is no significant difference within the 
high competence manipulations between the video and written conditions (t-statistic = 
0.360, p-value = 0.721). Further, those in the low competence manipulation have an 
average assessment of competence below the mid-point of 3, whereas those in the high 
competence manipulation have an average assessment of competence above the mid-
point of 3. These results suggest that the manipulation for high and low competence 
under the management information condition was effective. 





































 The significant differences in competence assessments between the high and low 
competence conditions are suggestive that the content of the manipulation was effective. 
However, to confirm my theory that the content of the manipulations does not affect 
judgments of evidence persuasiveness, but merely the presence of such information does, 
I compare the log likelihood assessments between the low and high competence 
conditions. See Table 11 and Figure 5 for results.  
 




























Figure 6: Management Information Breakout, Log Likelihood 
 
Note that there is only a main effect of communication channel, as outlined by my theory, 
and no impact of the content of the management information (t-statistic = 0.088, p-value 
= 0.931, t-statistic = 0.197, p-value = 0.845 for video and written conditions, 
respectively). These results help to validate my theory and may also call for a revision of 
prior studies’ conclusions. Auditors today appear to no longer assess evidence differently 










































 In the current study, I investigate the impact of communication channel and 
management information on auditor’s evaluation of evidence. Based on dual process 
theories, I predict and find that management information will lead auditors to focus more 
on the source of the evidence, management. Further, the availability of management 
characteristic cues in the communication channel influence the auditors’ ability to assess 
management during the management inquiry. As such influencing the propensity that the 
auditor will use a heuristic of management in their judgment of evidence persuasiveness. 
Written communication does not provide salient cues on management, whereas face-to-
face communication includes salient peripheral cues about management characteristics. 
Those characteristic cues are assessed more positively when communicating with a 
knowledgeable, neutral source. Therefore, when management information is provided, 
the use of positive assessments of management as heuristics under face-to-face 
communication leads to higher assessed persuasiveness versus written communication. 
By comparison, when no management information is provided, no heuristic is triggered 
and therefore auditors evaluate evidence persuasiveness no differently between face-to-
face and written channel of communication.  
 Supplemental analyses indicate that auditors’ processing of the information varies 
depending on the presence of management information. When management information 
is present, auditors recall a higher proportion of thoughts relating to management versus 
the message (i.e. evidence). This is indicative of a heightened focus on management, 
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which is indicative of the heuristic of the source being triggered. Furthermore, under the 
management information present condition, the pattern of auditors’ assessments of 
management’s characteristics is consistent with the pattern of evidence persuasiveness 
judgments. These results are consistent with the idea that auditors’ are relying on 
management characteristics assessed during the communication as their assessment for 
evidence persuasiveness.    
 This research is of practical importance because of an evolving audit 
environment, wherein the collection of evidence from management now routinely occurs 
through a variety of communication channels. Auditors and audit firms should be aware 
of these effects when performing audit procedures as well as in training auditors. 
Although it is important to assess the reliability of client management as part of audit 
procedures, and particularly fraud procedures, too much focus on such information may 
lead auditors to process evidence differently depending on the channel chosen for 
communicating. Many firms encourage face-to-face communication, however, this study 
speaks to a possible unintended consequence of communicating face-to-face with the 
client, specifically hindering the effectiveness of the audit, impacting audit quality. 
 Regulators should be particularly interested in these findings. Recent PCAOB 
inspection reports indicate a lack of documentation and professional skepticism in audit 
engagements (PCAOB, 2012). This study speaks to a possible source of this lack of 
documentation and professional skepticism. Because the current audit environment is 
much like the management information condition, my results suggest that auditors may 
be differentially evaluating the persuasiveness of evidence depending on the channel 
through which the evidence is collected.  
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 This study also has theoretical implications to accounting and social psychology 
literature. Auditing literature has primarily studied auditor judgment with limited 
interaction with the evidentiary source. Furthermore, recent regulatory changes have 
altered the way auditors approach audits, with more presumptive doubt skepticism than in 
the past. Therefore, this study should prompt investigation into prior research on auditor 
judgments. Specifically, how the content of management information may no longer 
effect auditor judgments. Instead, its presence can appears to influence the processing 
route used and ultimately the impact that the communication channel has on auditor 
judgments. Social psychology studies into the impact of communication channel on 
persuasive communications investigate opinion change as the dependent variable. I set 
forth clear theory as to why auditor’s processing will differ from that of individuals in the 
social psychology, based on the accountability auditors have for their judgments. This 
study adds to this stream of social psychology literature indicating how processing occurs 
for judgments made when the individuals are held accountable for their decisions.  
 Because very little has been done in this area to understand the impact of 
communication channel in management inquiry, this study is looking at a very general 
setting, which was designed to take the first step in understanding the impact of 
communication channel on auditor judgements. Therefore, it is important to understand 
its limitations, which offer a wealth of possible avenues for future research. The current 
study is limited by the context of the video used, which depicts management delivering 
the message in a neutral manner. Prior literature has indicated that other factors such as 
likeability impacts auditor judgments when evidence is provided in written form 
(Bhattacharjee et al. 2012). The theory developed in this paper should generalize to a 
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scenario where management is ineffective or overly negative in delivering a message. 
Auditors’ judgments of evidence persuasiveness are expected to be lower when 
management information is provided and communicated face-to-face due to the impact of 
those negative salient management characteristics. However, future research can confirm 
this expectation by investigating how channel of communication may lead to differential 
judgments when the client differs in likeability.  
 This study is also limited by the mechanism through which I have manipulated 
face-to-face communication. I choose a video to ensure strong internal validity, and 
believe it to be a conservative test of the impact of peripheral cues (see Chaiken & Eagly 
1983). However, there are differences between face-to-face and video which are not 
studied in the current experiment. Future research can investigate the other aspects of 
face-to-face communication, such as proximity of the communicators, immediacy of 
response, etc. to fully understand the impact it has on auditors’ judgments.  Lastly, the 
conclusions of this study are based on the judgements of senior auditors. It is quite likely, 
and actually expected, that auditors with varying levels of experience will process 
evidence differently, changing their propensity to rely on heuristics. Future study can 
evaluate the influence experience has on judgments in this context.  
  The results of this study speak to the most common scenario in management 
inquiry, when management information is present and auditors are communicating face-
to-face with client management delivering the message effectively in a neutral manner. 
This scenario, which is seen regularly in management inquiry, leads auditors to judge the 
evidence as most persuasive when there is no substantive reason for such a difference. 
This increased persuasiveness is due to differential processing of information, and no real 
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difference in the information provided to the auditor. When auditors judge the evidence 
as more persuasive in this situation, it is indicative of a lack of professional skepticism. 
This lack of professional skepticism can lead to a failure to collect sufficient evidence to 
satisfy management assertions. Due to the pervasive nature of management inquiry, this 
study suggests the combination of management information and face-to-face 
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